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11 Introduction
The problem of dividing an object so that everybody is satisﬁed with the share she receives
is an ancient one. Some interesting cases are reported in the Bible (e.g., Numbers 33:54) and
in the Babylonian Talmud (e.g., Kethubot 93a). Mathematical issues on the existence and
construction of a solution developed at a remarkable speed after the seminal works of Steinhaus
(1948) and Dubins and Spanier (1961); see, for example, Brams and Taylor (1996), Robertson
and Webb (1998), and the references therein.
In the literature, the satisfaction that an individual derives from the various parts of an
object S is described by a set function ν, which assigns to each part A of S the individual’s
(subjective) evaluation ν (A), with the convention ν (∅) = 0 and ν (S) = 1. Moreover, ν is
generally assumed to be additive, that is,
ν (A ∪ B) = ν (A) + ν (B)
if A and B are disjoint pieces.
If, for example, the individual is evaluating the various slices of a pizza, this amounts to
saying that she is as willing to eat slice A when she only ate slice B as when she ate both slices
B and C. In fact,
ν (B ∪ C ∪ A) − ν (B ∪ C) = ν (B ∪ A) − ν (B).
On the other hand, since pizza is quite satiating and non-storable, it is natural to investigate
what happens if the individual is more willing to eat slice A when she only ate slice B rather
than when she ate both slices B and C, that is, if
ν (B ∪ C ∪ A) − ν (B ∪ C) ≤ ν (B ∪ A) − ν (B). (1)
Set functions satisfying the above inequality for all disjoint sets A, B, and C are called concave.
The evaluation ν can take a simple form when the good to be divided is homogeneous.
In this case, the individual’s satisfaction depends only on the quantity µ(A) of the good she
receives and it is then natural to assume that ν (A) = u(µ(A)), where u is a “utility” function.
For example, if the plots of an homogeneous land are considered, µ(A) would be the Lebesgue
measure of the piece of land A. It is easy to see that ν is concave provided u is concave.
However, as pointed out by Shapley (1971) and Gilboa (1985), most concave evaluations do not
have such a simple form.
In this article we extend to concave evaluations some classic results for additive evaluations,
both existential (Section 2) and constructive (Section 3). In economics jargon, we are moving
from constant to decreasing marginal utilities (see Observations 1 and 2). To the best of our
knowledge, the only attempt in this direction was made by Berliant, Dunz, and Thomson (1992);
their approach, however, is quite diﬀerent from ours (see Section 4).
22 Preliminaries and main results
In this section we extend to the concave case the Cake Cutting and Fair Border existence
theorems due to Dubins and Spanier (1961) and Hill (1983), respectively.
We ﬁrst introduce some preliminary notions and properties. Given a measurable space
(S,Σ), a capacity on Σ is a set function ν : Σ → [0,1] such that:
(a) ν (∅) = 0 and ν (S) = 1.
(b) ν (A) ≤ ν (B) for all A,B ∈ Σ such that A ⊆ B,
(c) ν (Ak) ↓ 0 for any monotone sequence {Ak} ⊆ Σ with Ak ↓ ∅.
Assuming that the evaluation of an individual is a capacity means that she (weakly) prefers
more to less and that her satisfaction decreases to zero as the received slice vanishes.
A capacity ν is concave (or submodular) if
(d) ν (A ∪ B) ≤ ν (A) + ν (B) − ν (A ∩ B) for all A,B ∈ Σ,
while it is additive (or modular) if
(e) ν (A ∪ B) = ν (A) + ν (B) for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ.1
An additive capacity is called a probability measure. As discussed in the introduction, condition
(d) means that the marginal evaluation of the individual is decreasing, while (e) means that it
is constant. In fact:
Observation 1 Given a set function ν : Σ → [0,1] such that ν (∅) = 0, the following statements
are equivalent:
• ν is concave (additive, resp.);
• for all disjoint A,B,C ∈ Σ: ν (B ∪ C ∪ A) − ν (B ∪ C) ≤
(=, resp.)
ν (B ∪ A) − ν (B);
• for all A ∈ Σ: ν (B ∪ A) − ν (B) is decreasing (constant, resp.) in B ∈ Σ ∩ Ac, where
Σ ∩ Ac is the class of subsets of Σ disjoint from A.
Moreover, a natural way to obtain concave set functions is to aggregate additive ones through
a function with decreasing increments.
1Notice that this condition is equivalent to: ν (A ∪ B) = ν (A) + ν (B) − ν (A ∩ B) for all A,B ∈ Σ and
ν (∅) = 0.
3Observation 2 Let µ1,µ2,...,µd : Σ → [0,1] be additive set functions and let u : [0,1]
d → [0,1]
be a function such that u(0) = 0 and
u(x + h) − u(x) ≤
(=, resp.)
u(y + h) − u(y),
for all x ≥ y and all h ≥ 0 such that x,x + h,y,y + h ∈ [0,1]
d. Then the set function
ν (A) = u(µ1 (A),µ2 (A),...,µd (A)) ∀A ∈ Σ
is concave (additive, resp.).2
Finally, a capacity ν is nonatomic if
(f) for each set A such that ν (A) > 0 there exists B ⊆ A such that 0 < ν (B) < ν (A).
It is another continuity assumption on the preferences of the individuals.
We can now state our main result, in which we consider the fair division problem with
concave evaluations.
Theorem 1 (Cake Cutting) Let ν1,ν2,...,νn be nonatomic concave capacities on a measur-
able space (S,Σ). Given any α1,α2,...,αn ≥ 0 with
Pn
i=1 αi = 1, there exists a partition
{A1,A2,...,An} of S in Σ such that
νi(Ai) ≥ αi
for each i = 1,2,...,n. Moreover, if νj 6= νk for some j 6= k and α1,α2,...,αn > 0, the partition
{A1,A2,...,An} can be chosen to satisfy
νi(Ai) > αi
for each i = 1,2,...,n.
Proof. Let i ∈ {1,2,...,n} and C (νi) be the set of all probability measures µ such that
µ(B) ≤ νi (B) for all B ∈ Σ.
Claim 0. For all A ∈ Σ, νi (A) = maxµ∈C(νi) µ(A).
The proof can obtained from the results of Shapley (1971) and Schmeidler (1972). In fact,
the set function deﬁned by ¯ νi (A) = 1 − νi (Ac) for all A ∈ Σ is a “convex game continuous
at S” and C (νi) is its “core”. We provide an alternative simple proof building on a result of
Kelley (1959).
Let A ∈ Σ and consider the probability measure λ on Λ = {∅,A,Ac,S} deﬁned by λ(∅) = 0,
λ(A) = νi (A), λ(Ac) = 1 − νi (A), λ(S) = 1. Concavity of νi implies 1 − νi (A) ≤ νi (Ac),
hence λ(L) ≤ νi (L) for all L ∈ Λ. By Theorem 14 of Kelley (1959), there exists an extension
2See, e.g., Marinacci and Montrucchio (2002).
4ˆ λ of λ to Σ satisfying (a), (b), (e) and such that ˆ λ(B) ≤ νi (B) for every B ∈ Σ. Moreover,
if {Bk} ⊆ Σ and Bk ↓ ∅, then ˆ λ(Bk) ≤ νi (Bk) → 0, that is ˆ λ ∈ C (νi). We have shown that
for every A ∈ Σ there exists ˆ λ ∈ C (νi) such that νi (A) = ˆ λ(A); since νi (A) ≥ µ(A) for every
µ ∈ C (νi), we have νi (A) = maxµ∈C(νi) µ(A). 
Claim 1. There exists λi ∈ C (νi) such that each µ ∈ C (νi) is absolutely continuous with respect
to λi, that is A ∈ Σ and λi (A) = 0 imply µ(A) = 0.
For completeness we report the proof, essentially due to Schmeidler (1972).
It is easy to see that C (νi) is convex. If {Ak} ⊆ Σ and Ak ↓ ∅, then maxµ∈C(νi) µ(Ak) =
νi (Ak) → 0, by Theorem IV.9.1 of Dunford and Schwartz (1958), C (νi) is weakly sequentially
compact.3 Therefore, replacing “ 1
2i ” by “ 1
mn ” at the bottom of p. 307, Theorem IV.9.2 of
Dunford and Schwartz (1958) guarantees the existence of the desired λi ∈ C (νi). 
Claim 2. C (νi) consists of nonatomic probability measures.
Assume that there exists an atom for λi, i.e. a set A ∈ Σ with λi (A) > 0 and such
that, for any Σ 3 B ⊆ A, either λi (B) = 0 or λi (B) = λi (A). Since λi (A) > 0, then
νi (A) > 0. Let Σ 3 B ⊆ A. Either λi (B) = 0, then µ(B) = 0 for every µ ∈ C (νi) and
νi (B) = 0; or λi (B) = λi (A), then λi (A − B) = 0 and µ(A − B) = 0 for every µ ∈ C (νi),
so µ(B) = µ(A) for every µ ∈ C (νi), whence νi (B) = νi (A). Then A is an atom for νi, a
contradiction. Therefore λi is nonatomic. Next we show that this implies the nonatomicity
of all elements µ in C (νi). Suppose, per contra, that there exists a µ in C (νi) having an
atom A. Since µ(A) > 0, we have λi (A) > 0. Let {A1,B1} be a partition of A such that
λi (A1) = λi (B1) = 1
2λi(A). It must be either µ(A1) = µ(A) or µ(B1) = µ(A). Without loss
of generality, assume µ(A1) = µ(A), A1 is an atom for µ. Let {A2,B2} be a partition of A1
such that λi (A2) = λi (B2) = 1
2λi(A1) = 1
22λi(A). It must be either µ(A2) = µ(A1) = µ(A)
or µ(B2) = µ(A1) = µ(A). Without loss of generality, assume µ(A2) = µ(A). Proceeding
in this way, we can construct a decreasing sequence {Ak} ⊆ Σ such that λi (Ak) = 1
2kλi(A)
and µ(Ak) = µ(A) for all k ≥ 1. Hence, λi (
T∞
k=1 Ak) = 0 and µ(
T∞
k=1 Ak) = µ(A) > 0, a
contradiction. 
Corollary 1.1 of Dubins and Spanier (1961) guarantees the existence of a partition {A1,A2,...,An}
of S in Σ such that
νi(Ai) ≥ λi (Ai) ≥ αi
for each i = 1,2,...,n.
If νj 6= νk, it must be C (νj) 6= C (νk). Choose µj ∈ C (νj) and µk ∈ C (νk) such that
µj 6= µk and µi ∈ C (νi) arbitrarily, if i 6= j,k. If α1,α2,...,αn > 0, by Corollary 1.2 of Dubins
and Spanier (1961), there exists a partition {A1,A2,...,An} of S in Σ such that
νi(Ai) ≥ µi (Ai) > αi




, such that µnk (A) converges for
all A ∈ Σ.
5for each i = 1,2,...,n. Q.E.D.
As the elements A1,...,An of the partition in Theorem 1 can be nastily shaped, it is im-
portant to know whether it is possible to guarantee to each participant a true slice of the cake
rather than a bunch of crumbs. This problem is relevant in territorial disputes where, for ex-
ample, n farmers have to partition a land bordering each of their properties. Hill (1983) solves
the problem for evaluations represented by nonatomic probability measures; the next theorem
extends his result to the case of nonatomic concave capacities. The proof, which is similar to
that of Theorem 1, is omitted.
Theorem 2 (Fair Border) Let L,F1,F2,...,Fn be open connected subsets in R2 with Fi ad-
jacent to L for all i = 1,2,...,n.4 If ν1,ν2,...,νn are nonatomic concave (Borel) capacities on
L, and α1,α2,...,αn ≥ 0 with
Pn
i=1 αi = 1. Then there exist disjoint open connected subsets
A1,A2,...,An of L such that
• Ai is adjacent to Fi for all i = 1,2,...,n,
• νi(Ai) ≥ αi for all i = 1,2,...,n, and
•
Sn
i=1 Ai ⊇ L.
Moreover, if νj 6= νk for some j 6= k and α1,α2,...,αn > 0, then A1,A2,...,An can be chosen
to satisfy
νi(Ai) > αi
for each i = 1,2,...,n.
Like the original result, this theorem holds for subsets of Rk, and, dropping all adjacency
requirements, it yields the existence of a fair division of a connected cake into connected slices.
Notice that the hypotheses of both theorems can be weakened by requiring instead of con-
cavity the condition:
(d’) ν (A) = maxµ∈C(ν) µ(A) for all A ∈ Σ,
called exactness (see Claim 0 in the proof of Theorem 1). As shown in Schmeidler (1972),
exactness is a condition weaker than concavity and stronger than subadditivity:
(d”) ν (C ∪ A) ≤ ν (C) + ν (A) for all disjoint A,C ∈ Σ,
which says that the individual is more willing to eat slice A when she had no pizza at all rather
than when she already ate a slice C.5 We are not sure whether subadditivity is suﬃcient to
yield our existence results.
4Open connected subsets A and B of R
2 are adjacent if ∂A ∩ ∂B contains an open arc γ (homeomorphic
image of (0,1)) such that A ∪ B ∪ γ is open and connected.
5Notice that condition (d”) can be obtained by setting B = ∅ in Eq. (1) in the Introduction.
63 Banach-Knaster Revisited
In this section we observe that two famous constructive solutions to the fair division problem,
originally stated with additivity as one of the assumptions, can be obtained in the same way
with subadditivity in place of additivity.
The following famous result, due to Banach and Knaster, constructively yields a division
of a cake among n individuals such that any individual evaluates the slice she has received at
least 1
n.
“...The partners being ranged A, B, C, . . . , N, A cuts from the cake an arbitrary
part. B has now the right, but is not obliged, to diminish the slice cut oﬀ. Whatever he
does, C has the right (without obligation) to diminish still the already diminished (or not
diminished) slice, and so on up to N. The rule obliges the “last diminisher” to take as his
part the slice he was the last to touch. This partner being thus disposed of, the remaining
n-1 persons start the same game with the remainder of the cake...The hypotheses underlying
the procedure described are: (1) the ideal shares due to the partners are not contested by
any of them; (2) the object is continuous, so as to make it possible to cut oﬀ it a slice of
value pV, V being the value of the whole and p any fraction between 0 and 1; the same
applies to every part which can be cut oﬀ the object; (3) the sum of values of parts is equal
to the value of the whole; the same applies to every part...” Steinhaus (1948).
Reading the description, it is easy to realize that the method still works if one replaces (3) with:
(3’) the sum of values of parts is not smaller than the value of the whole; the same applies to
every part.
This is simply a restatement of subadditivity. Notice that, in the cited procedure, partners’
assignments change from no cake to a piece of cake, a situation where subadditivity yields the
same behavioral information as concavity in terms of decreasing marginal evaluation.
The disadvantage of this method is that the cake may well end up in crumbs when the
last participants choose their shares. To overcome it, Dubins and Spanier (1961) reﬁned the
technique, suggesting the Sliding Knife procedure.
“...A knife is slowly moved at constant speed parallel to itself over the top of the cake.
At each instant the knife is poised so that it could cut a unique slice of the cake. As times
goes by the potential slice increases monotonely from nothing until it becomes the entire
cake. The ﬁrst person to indicate satisfaction with the slice then determined by the position
of the knife receives that slice and is eliminated from further distribution of the cake. (If
two or more participants simultaneously indicate satisfaction with the slice, it is given to
any one of them.) The process is repeated with the other n-1 participants and with what
remains of the cake...The method described above is equally applicable for the division of
any object provided only that (1) the value assigned by any participant to any part of the
7object equals the sum of the values of the subparts when the part is subdivided into any
ﬁnite number of subparts; and (2) the value to each participant of the potential slice varies
in a continuous fashion as the knife is moved over the object...”
Again, the technique does not require the full power of (1), but the following restatement of
subadditivity is enough:
(1’) the value assigned by any participant to any part of the object is not greater than the
sum of the values of the subparts when the part is subdivided into any ﬁnite number of
subparts.
We conclude by observing that, when α1,α2,...,αn is a n-tuple of nonnegative rational
numbers adding up to 1, for additive evaluations the above procedures can be easily adapted to
yield a division in which the ith participant receives at least αi. Barbanel (1995) suggested a
method that yields (using the same assumptions as Banach and Knaster) such a partition even
if the αis are not rational. The extension of such results to subadditive or concave evaluations
is the object of future research.
4 Concluding Remarks
1. In some situations it is possible to give natural behavioral conditions on the individuals’
preferences that guarantee the existence of unique nonatomic exact (or concave) capacities
representing them. In other words it is possible to give fully behavioral versions of Theorems 1
and 2. Consider the following bucolic example. In a village, n farmers share a common orchard
and each farmer i is entitled to receive a fraction αi of the whole production. The farmers
suspect each other of stealing fruits at night and argue over who should work in the orchard.
The mayor of the village would like to assign to each of them a single piece of land so to solve
all the disputes.
For all pairwise disjoint subsets B1,B2,...,Bm of S and for all β1,β2,...,βm ∈ [0,1], let
β1B1 + β2B2 + ... + βmBm be the entitlement to receive a fraction βj of the production of lot
Bj. All these entitlements are represented by the (convex) set of measurable simple functions
on S taking values in [0,1]. By using standard techniques (see, e.g., Schmeidler, 1989, Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989, and Chateauneuf, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Tallon, 2002) it is easy to
come up with axioms on the farmers’ preferences %i that deliver the existence of unique exact
(or concave) capacities νi representing their evaluations of the lots.
2. Both the Cake Cutting and the Fair Border theorems rely on the Lyapunov Theorem; that
is, on the fact that the range {(µ1 (A),µ2 (A),...,µn (A)) : A ∈ Σ} of a vector (µ1,µ2,...,µn) of
nonatomic probability measures is a convex subset of Rn. It is thus natural to wonder whether
a similar result holds for a vector of nonatomic concave capacities. Unfortunately, this is not






, where µ is the Borel measure on [0,1].
83. Berliant, Dunz, and Thomson (1992) proved that a result analogous to Theorem 2 holds for
the following class of set functions deﬁned on the Borel σ-algebra B of an open subset L of Rk:
“...Let m be Lebesgue measure on Rk...The function ui : B → R+ is concave if there
exists a function hi : {(x,B) ∈ L × B : x ∈ B} → R+ such that
(i) for all B ∈ B, hi (·,B) is integrable,
(ii) for all B,B0 ∈ B with B0 ⊆ B, for all x ∈ B0, hi (x,B0) ≥ hi (x,B), and
(iii) for all B ∈ B, ui (B) =
R
B hi (x,B)dm(x)...”
Setting fi (x) = hi (x,L) for each i, it is easy to see that (i)-(iii) are stronger than the following
condition:
(iv) There exists an integrable function fi : L → R+ such that ui (B) ≥
R
B fi (x)dm(x)
for all B ∈ B and equality holds if B = L.
On the other hand, normalizing ui (L) = 1 for each i, it is easy to show that condition (iv)
yields Theorem 2. In fact, the set function µi (B) =
R
B fi (x)dm(x) is a nonatomic probability
measure on B such that ui ≥ µi; then, by Theorem 2 of Hill (1983), the desired fair division
exists.
It is important to observe that, diﬀerently from our assumptions, both (i)-(iii) and (iv)
invoke the existence of the “extraneous objects” his and fis.
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